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Abstract 
Overconfident judgments are common. We are often more confident about things than we 
should be, and this may lead us to make maladaptive decisions. Debiasing confidence by 
cuing people in to how confident they should be could help people make better choices. 
However, people may be unwilling to accept debiasing information if doing so implies 
their own ignorance. This study examined whether self-affirmation can buffer people 
against threats to self-image, helping people to accept debiasing cues. I hypothesized that 
combining a cue with self-affirmation would lead to enhanced debiasing over cues or 
self-affirmation alone. In order to investigate this hypothesis, first a pilot study was used 
to create veridical cues for implementation in the main experimental design. The 
experiment used a memory task in which participants were asked to rate their confidence 
for future recall. The experiment used a 2 (cue) x 2 (self-affirmation) experimental 
design. No evidence for the effect of self-affirmation, or the interaction between cue and 
self-affirmation was found. Consequently, the experimental hypothesis was not 
supported. Future research may seek to investigate whether a stronger self-affirmation 
manipulation, or whether using a task with greater inherent self-threat, changes these 
results.
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Reducing Knowledge Overconfidence by 
Reducing the Threat of Knowledge Cue Utilization 
Evidence suggests that people are often more confident than knowledgeable 
(Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977). Such knowledge overconfidence can have 
consequential effects, if it leads to maladaptive choices. Consider as an example a college 
student who incorrectly concludes that she has mastered material for her next exam. As a 
result of this misperception, she decides to stop studying too soon and goes on to perform 
poorly on her exam. Her decision to stop studying early could be interpreted as evidence 
that she had too much confidence in her knowledge. Ideally, her appraisals of her own 
knowledge would be more closely linked to her mastery of the material, such that she 
only stops studying when she knows enough to meet her goals on the exam. This example 
highlights the potential value in trying to “debias” confidence judgments, so that 
individuals make more adaptive choices. 
One obvious first step in debiasing overconfidence might be to present some kind 
of information suggesting that a correction is necessary. With the college student, for 
instance, one might present objective information to her suggesting that she does not 
know what she believes she does know. Evidence suggests, however, that such 
information might fail to influence the decisions of many students. Pulford  and Colman 
(1997) found, for instance, that overconfidence can persist even after individuals receive 
immediate feedback revealing their lack of mastery on a knowledge test. An alternative 
strategy might be to provide the student with less personal information suggesting to her 
that most students like her perform poorly on the test she will take. Research suggests, 
however, that people also fail to use external decision aids that might guide knowledge 
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evaluations and instead persist in basing their judgments on personal intuitions (Sieck & 
Arkes, 2005). 
It is the combination of overconfidence in knowledge judgments and reluctance to 
utilize external cues that might debiase confidence judgments that is the focus of the 
current research. My focus is on seeking methods to get individuals to give more weight 
to external cues, when they have the potential to debias confident judgments. Such a cue 
can be termed a veridical cue if it is based on objective information about performance. 
The veridical cue should be a good predictor of performance, because it is based on real 
data. However, I argue that people often fail to rely on veridical knowledge cues because 
there is an ego threat inherent in admitting one’s own ignorance. As a result, there may be 
value in pairing veridical decision aids with efforts to “buffer” individuals against ego 
threats, so that they will utilize the veridical decision aids made available to them. 
Evidence for this thesis can be found in the cognitive dissonance literature, to which I 
now turn. 
Cognitive Dissonance Perspectives on Overconfidence and Debiasing 
The Cognitive Dissonance literature has long focused on people’s motive to 
maintain consonance between their cognitions and behavior (Festinger, 1957). Over time, 
this motive has come to be described as a motive to maintain a desirable self-image, in 
light of one’s own actions (Aronson, 1969; Steele, 1988). The classic example is of 
forced compliance, as in Festinger and Carlsmith 1959, wherein participants were asked 
to lie about a boring task they had completed, and tell another student it was fun. The 
self-image of the participant as an honest person was dissonant with the statement made 
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about the task, and some participants resolved this by changing their attitude toward the 
task to be consonant with their statement. 
Work on post-decisional dissonance presents a mechanism by which Dissonance 
influences judgment confidence. The post-decisional dissonance model predicts that, 
when a decision is made, dissonance should occur to the extent that there are lingering 
doubts about the choice made (See Brehm, 1956). Knox and Inkster (1968) demonstrated 
this principle with gamblers betting on horse races. They showed that confidence in the 
success of a bet was higher after the bet had been placed than before. Confidence was 
presumed to have been driven up to reduce gamblers’ post decisional dissonance. In this 
instance, gamblers may have wanted to avoid the thought that they had wasted their 
money, and this motivation may have resulted in elevated confidence ratings. 
Knox and Inkster (1968) focused on confidence for a past event, but people’s 
confidence about future task performance may also be subject to the effects of motivated 
change. Consider a student who has an upcoming exam. Although the student’s 
confidence in exam performance should be related to task relevant knowledge, which 
should in turn predict actual performance, there may be motivated influences as well. In 
this example, a strong personal investment in academic achievement may bias 
confidence, independent of exam preparation. This can result in a student feeling 
confident about an upcoming exam, but performing below their own expectations. 
A cognitive dissonance account of precisely this type of knowledge 
overconfidence was tested in Blanton, Pelham, DeHart, and Carvallo (2001). They found 
a relationship between the importance students place on an exam question and the 
confidence they had in their performance. This relationship held, even after controlling 
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for actual knowledge.   The tendency to feel confident, independent of accuracy, suggests 
that participants were basing their judgments on something other than a cold analysis of 
their knowledge.  Moreover, Blanton et al. (2001) found that confidence was least tied to 
accuracy when ego threat was high.  This was demonstrated through an experimental 
manipulation.  Prior to the confidence ratings, participants either were or were not 
reminded of an option to drop the lowest exam.  Blanton et al. found that confidence was 
highest (independent of accuracy) when there was no such reminder.  This pattern 
suggests that one reason knowledge confidence operated independent of actual 
knowledge was that it helped diminish the threat of doing poorly, when there was greater 
ego involvement in a strong exam performance. 
This finding suggests a possibility of debiasing confidence ratings. Insofar as 
dissonance threats represent threats to self-image, one might reduce or remove these 
threats as a possible avenue for debiasing. One way to tackle threats to self-image is to 
use self-affirmations, consistent with Steele’s (1988) model of cognitive dissonance. A 
self-affirmation can take the form of a task in which people are encouraged to affirm 
important self-values, which act as buffers against possible threats to self image 
encountered after the affirmation. 
Evidence from Blanton et al. (2001) suggests that self-affirmation may debias 
overconfidence. Their study demonstrated that confidence in a judgment task increased in 
tandem with increased importance placed on the task, independent of actual performance 
or ability.  In a design echoing earlier work on post-decisional dissonance, they found 
that participants in a taste test were more confident about their ability to discriminate 
between Coke and Pepsi if they initially indicated a strong preference for one flavor over 
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the other. This effect occurred independent of actual taste-discrimination ability, 
suggesting that there was ego involvement. Specifically, individuals who felt they 
preferred one cola over the other were motivated to believe that they could discriminate 
between the colas. They were thus more confident, independent of their accuracy. More 
important for debiasing, however, when a self affirmation task was given before 
confidence was measured, this relationship was diminished. Among affirmed 
participants, the stated preference in a cola did not exert influence on confidence after 
controlling for accuracy.  This study appears to show that the mere act of affirming an 
individual will remove the influence of motivation on confidence judgments. 
A Study Limitation 
Blanton et al.’s (2001) interpretation of their finding was that an affirmation can 
be sufficient to debias confidence judgments. However, there may have been a key 
artifact in their study that was helping them attain their effect. In their original design, an 
external cue was presented to all participants. All participants were given information 
regarding the average performance of students on the taste-discrimination task. This cue 
was intended to reduce noise in participants’ confidence estimates but it might have 
played a more vital role. An alternative interpretation of Blanton et al.’s (2001) results is 
that self-affirmation influenced the acceptance of this external cue for participants in this 
condition. In this interpretation, an affirmation will not influence confidence by itself. If 
this interpretation is accurate, when cues needed to calibrate levels of confidence are not 
present, self-affirmation should have little to no effect on overconfidence. 
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Cognitive Attempts to Debias Overconfidence 
Research to date has not tested if affirmations help individuals make better use of 
a debiasing cue. To the contrary, the approaches taken towards overconfidence debiasing 
have often focused on cognitive mechanisms, with little concern for motivation (see 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 1981).  As a result, the potential ego threat inherent 
in accepting debiasing information presented by an experimenter has not been 
considered. Instead of examining the motivations people may have for maintaining 
overconfidence, research has centered on cognitive biases such as people’s difficulty in 
understanding probability (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980) and biased information 
processing (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). Debiasing often takes the form of 
training individuals to specifically correct these cognitive biases, or, as recently shown in 
studies by Zimmerman and Kelley (2010), simply allowing participants to repeat tasks so 
that they can learn from their previous performances.  
The debiasing method I am proposing is straightforward compared to many 
cognitive attempts, as it rests on simply providing participants with veridical information 
that can guide confidence estimates.  I argue that such an approach may be threatening, 
however, and there is some evidence to support this view. A study by Sieck and Arkes 
(2005) showed that baserate information can increase the correspondence of the 
relationship between performance and confidence, but cues in this experiment were 
effective only when presented to participants using an enhanced method. This method 
involved an elaborate three-step procedure designed to drive home the risk of 
overconfidence. First researchers showed participants how their past performance 
compared to their earlier confidence ratings. Participants were then asked to decide if 
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their prior performance suggested they were originally overconfident or underconfident. 
Finally, participants reported how much their original confidence ratings should change 
for them to match their later performance. I am proposing that this level of involvement is 
necessary, in part, because participants are motivated not to use the cue provided by these 
researchers, but I am predicting that my participants will use a veridical cue without such 
heavy involvement, if an affirmation is presented. 
Summary and Study Overview 
I propose a motivated model of confidence, similar to Blanton et al. (2001), but 
with the caveat that people do require information from which to base their confidence. 
Rather than claiming that self-affirmation has an effect on confidence by itself, this 
model posits that self-affirmation has influence over the degree to which veridical 
information is accepted and used as a basis for confidence. In a task where people likely 
already have inflated confidence judgments regarding their future performance, external 
cues that suggest future performance does not match expected performance might be 
threatening to self-esteem. Because of this threat to self-esteem, people may benefit from 
being affirmed before they are able to incorporate these cues into their confidence 
judgments.  
Additionally, this model posits the influence of self-affirmation on cue 
acceptance, not on confidence directly. Consequently, self-affirmation debiasing should 
work on a cognitive bias, not just overconfidence where strong motives for confidence 
inflation are present. The two studies described by Blanton et al. (2001) used tasks where 
ego-involvement was clearly indicated. Therefore, replication of these tasks would not 
enable a rigorous test of this model.  
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The task I chose to use was a standard judgment of learning (JOL) procedure. 
Much like in the example of the student taking an exam, participants following this 
procedure have a study period during which they have to judge the likelihood that they 
will be able to perform well on a following exam. In the learning period, participants are 
presented with word pairs that they are to remember and asked to estimate the likelihood 
they will remember the word pair during a subsequent learning task. To increase the 
likelihood that participants will overestimate their learning for at least some of the words, 
I also took advantage of a JOL finding reported in Zimmerman and Kelley (2010). They 
showed that confidence was inflated by word valence in a JOL task. That is, participants 
over-estimate the likelihood of remembering word pairs if each word has a negative 
emotional valence (e.g., sick, ugly). Although this effect probably does not reflect a self-
esteem motive, I am suggesting that there may be esteem threat in relying on an accuracy 
cue, when it informs participants that they will have difficulty remembering such words.  
In such a task, self-affirmation’s direct effect on confidence should be negligible 
under the current proposed model. Self-affirmation debiasing of such a bias affords the 
strongest test of this model. Within the framework of a cognitive bias on JOL, debiasing 
as a result only of a self-affirmation manipulation is not expected. However, presentation 
of external cues may debias confidence alone. More importantly, the model of self-
affirmation as an influence on cue acceptance predicts that the greatest debiasing should 
be shown when self-affirmation and cues are delivered together, rather than separate. 
Overview 
The study was broken into two phases of development. First, participants were 
recruited for an initial pilot study, and then, after the pilot study was completed, more 
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participants were recruited for the main experiment. This final experiment included 
between-subjects manipulations of external cue presentation and self-affirmation. A pilot 
study was required to generate veridical cues for participants to use in the main  
experiment. To this end, participants in the pilot study took part in a simplified version of 
our main experiment’s design. 
Pilot Study 
Participants 
 Participants in the pilot study were 22 college students recruited from the 
University of Connecticut Psychology Participant Pool for participation in a “memory 
study.” 
Materials 
As in Zimmerman and Kelley (2010), all words used as stimuli in this experiment 
were taken from Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). In 
total, 84 words taken directly from Zimmerman and Kelley (2010) were used in the pilot 
study. Another 14 words were taken from ANEW. These pairs were broken in two series 
of 42 word pairs, where each series consisted of 35 word pairs from Zimmerman and 
Kelley (2010), and either 7 more words pairs from the same study, or 7 new words pairs 
as taken from ANEW. 
To record participants’ JOL, or their confidence for correctly recalling words, an 
eleven-point scale was used with labels that indicated percentage chance that a word 
would be remembered.  Points on the scale were marked as 0%, 10%, etc up to 100%. On 
this scale, 0% was described as representing no confidence in a word being correctly 
recalled, whereas 100% represented total confidence in a word being correctly recalled. 
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Procedure 
The JOL task consisted of a simple paired associates learning task. During this 
first phase of the task, participants were instructed to try to memorize 42 word pairs 
shown onscreen for 5 seconds. One word in the pair was always marked as the cue word, 
and the other as the target word. The cue word was explained to be the word used in the 
recall phase to prompt recall of the target word.  
During the testing phase, the second part of the memory task, only one half of the 
pair, the cue word, was presented. All 42 cue words were presented in the same order of 
as they had been shown in the study phase. The participant was required to recall and 
enter the target word by keyboard into a text box on their computer screen. Participants 
were allowed to proceed through the testing phase at their own pace. During this second 
phase of the JOL task, all words typed into the computer by participants were stored as 
text. A recall score was determined by comparing words recalled by participants to the 
actual target word requested, with a match being marked as correct, and any other answer 
marked as incorrect. A match was defined as either the target word, including misspelled 
target words, or a singular or plural form of the target word. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants’ recall of words in the pilot study offered data on which to provide 
meaningful cues in the main experiment. In addition, it provided some insight into how 
word actual recall related to estimated recall. Mean recall for positive words was 42.86%, 
for neutral words 28.57% and for negative words 27.47%. Mean JOL for positive words 
was 51.33%, for neutral words 44.91% and for negative words 48.91% (see Table 1.). 
These results replicate Zimmerman et al. (2010) in that mean JOL for negative and 
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positive words were relatively high, but negative words were recalled correctly much less 
often than positive words. This indicates that, although predicted recall was higher than 
actual recall for all three types of words on average, the largest discrepancy was for 
negative words.  
The advantage of including a mix of neutral and positive words in the Main Study 
that follows is that there is variability in the degree of correspondence between actual and 
estimated recall.  By including all three types, participants thus encountered a mix of 
word pairs where they might do relatively well by trusting their private estimation (e.g., 
neutral pairs) but other word pairs (e.g., negative pairs) where they should not go with 
their gut but instead trust the cue.  To maximize this form of variability, seven negative 
word pairs deemed too easy, by virtue of being recalled correctly more often than other 
similar words in pilot testing, were not used in the main study. All other words were used 
as stimuli in the main experiments. Percentage recall from the pilot study was rounded up 
to the nearest ten, and these were used as the cues presented to participants in the main 
experiment (see Table 2.). 
Main Study 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited from the University of Connecticut Psychology 
Participant Pool from for participation in a “memory study.” In total, 146 college students 
were recruited. 
Materials 
 Two memory tasks were used in this experiment. The main memory task used 
words that were taken from the pilot study that were found to have both high and low 
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discrepancy between JOL estimation and recall. In addition, a practice task was added to 
give participants familiarity with the task to reduce noise in responding. The practice task 
used 84 words taken from ANEW (Bradley & Lang, 1999). These words were chosen 
because their affect rating was close to 4.5 on a 9 point scale, making them relatively 
neutral. A separate list of 84 words were used for the second task.  
Procedure 
 The main experiment was split into three phases, first a practice memory task, 
then a debiasing procedure, and then a second experiment memory task. All memory 
tasks were identical to the one described above in the pilot study, except for minor 
changes as noted. These words acted as a practice block for participants to familiarize 
themselves with the memory task procedure and the reporting of JOLs.1 
After the practice memory task was completed, participants were given their 
assigned debiasing procedure, based on a 2 (Affirmation or No-Affirmation) X 2 
(External Cue or No-Cue) factorial design. Participants were assigned to complete either 
a self-affirmation task or a US state and city naming task. The self-affirmation task was 
presented as a thought-listing questionnaire. Using the same task as in Blanton et al. 
(2001), participants were first asked to write a description of a value, talent, relationship, 
or identity that was both important to them and made them feel proud. To provide a 
double dose of the affirmation, in order to maximize the effects of the affirmation lasted 
the entire course of the experiment, participants were asked to write a second time about 
something they were good at and did better than average. The two writing tasks, 
                                                 
1
 The advantage of adding a practice task is that it gave participants greater familiarity with the task so that 
they would not be distracted learning a new task after the affirmation procedure.   
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completed back-to-back, allowed participants to affirm whatever aspect of themselves 
they chose to describe. 
A U.S. state and world city naming task was used as a control condition to the 
affirmation task. Completing this task put participants through a similar, but non 
affirming task to self-affirmed participants. This task, like the self-affirmation task, 
consisted of two parts; a state naming task and a city naming task. The U.S. state naming 
task consisted of participants naming the first 30 U.S. states they could think of. In case 
participants were unable to name 30 states, and to avoid any threat to self that may occur 
in such a circumstance, little emphasis was placed on participants actually meeting this 
goal within the time allowed for the task. To prevent this task providing a self-esteem 
boost by a participant naming all the US states, participants were limited to naming 30 
states and were not able to list all 50 states. After naming states, the participants were 
asked to name 30 cities located anywhere in the world. Similar instructions to the state 
naming task were provided, whereby it was made clear that participants did not have to 
name 30 cities if they were unable, but should try to enter as many as they could. 
The final part of this study was a second memory task. This task was the same as 
the first, but using the words adapted from the pilot study. Presentation was fixed so that 
words did not repeat by valence, to avoid clumping of words of the same valence that 
might occur if the order of presentation was completely randomized. 
As participants made their JOL response in the final memory task, half of all 
participants were provided with feedback on average participant performance for that 
specific word pair (taken from the Pilot study). Participants were presented with feedback 
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on the scale used to provide JOLs, but were free to ignore feedback and provide a 
different JOL than the one suggested. 
Results 
Analysis of the External Cue 
 For external cues to be of use in debiasing overconfidence, those cues must be 
related to actual recall performance. To explore this issue, I examined the estimated recall 
and actual recall of participants in only the control condition, as they reveal how 
individuals performed before any experimental manipulations were applied. For 
participants in this condition, a single residual score was computed, by subtracting 
predicted recall from actual recall. These results of this analysis are shown in Table 3.  
This analysis revealed that, on average, actual word recall was 3.24% lower than the 
external cue (SD = 12.16). This suggests that overall, the feedback was reasonably 
accurate.  There was variability in the utility of the cues, however. Specifically, two 
words had performance differences larger than two standard deviations from zero 
(Beach-Circus; Betray Terrible), indicating that cues were less well linked to actual 
performance. Because one might question if the cues for these words provided a veridical 
basis for judging later performance, these words were both removed from further 
analyses. 
Overall residual provides information on only one aspect of the relationship of 
cue to recall.  There also is value in examining if the estimated recall from a given cue 
covaries with actual recall.  After removing the two outliers, a simple correlation of the 
data in Table 3 revealed that external cue and true recall were correlated r(38) = .72, p < 
0.001, indicating a strong positive relationship between the external cue given and recall. 
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This speaks to the potential validity of the cues, suggesting that participants should 
estimate a greater likelihood of correct recall for word pairs when the cue suggests recall 
is likely and a lower likelihood of correct recall for word pairs when the cue suggests 
recall is unlikely. 
Finally, regression analyses were performed to examine how the metric in the 
external cue mapped on to the likelihood of correctly recalling a word.  Specifically, 
recall was regressed on cue. If external cues are to be of use to participants for debiasing, 
it is not sufficient for the correlation coefficient to be strong (as indicated above), but the 
metric of the two scores must line up.  Consider the regression line linking the external 
cue to recall.  This linear relationship can be represented by 
 Y = B(X)  +  a  
where Y is recall as predicted by variable X, the external cue, with a slope of B and an 
intercept of a. If the cue provides completely veridical prediction of recall, then this 
equation should have B = 1 and a = 0. This ideal relationship is represented by the dotted 
identity line in Figure 1.  In contrast, the data produced a linear relationship with a slope 
of B = 0.73, and an intercept of 6.82, the solid line in Figure 1.   
 The results of the above regression show that the external cue was related to true 
recall at close to a one-to-one relationship. As a cue, this relationship is desirable, as the 
cue was designed to be a good anchor for participants to use when determining the 
confidence they should have in task performance. However, for the cue to improve 
prediction, it also needs to be more strongly linked to recall than a participant’s intuitive 
confidence. To examine this issue, I next explored the relationship between recall and 
JOL for each word pair. 
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The correlation of recall and average word confidence was quite strong, r(38) = 
.52, p = 0.001. This suggests that participants did have insight into which word pairs were 
relatively easy and which were relatively difficult. However, as before, a simple 
correlation coefficient conveys only some information. To examine the metric relations 
between recall and prediction, a regression of recall on to average word confidence was 
performed. This revealed a slope of B = 2.48, and an intercept of -64.63. This slope is 
further from the ideal slope of 1 than the slope for the external cue. Moreover, the 
intercept is further away from the ideal of 0 than the intercept produced generated by the 
external cue. This comparison indicates that the cue should be a better predictor of recall 
than intuitive confidence, and so participants would increase correspondence between 
confidence and recall to the extent that they are given the external cue and make use of it. 
 Particularly visible in figure 2 is a marked restriction in range for confidence 
ratings. Confidence ratings had a standard deviation of only 3.09%, with a range of 
between 33.08% and 43.59%, across all words. This compared to a standard deviation of 
14.84%, with a range of between 30.26% and 58.97%, for recall. This suggests that 
participants in the control condition were unable to track the range of difficulty of words 
when reporting confidence. Words that were difficult to remember on average, and had 
correspondingly low scores on recall, tended to be rated at levels of confidence similar to 
most other, easier words. 
Further, the regression of confidence on recall, with a large negative intercept, 
and steep slope, showed that average word confidence was often higher than suggested 
by recall. Twenty-six of the total 40 words fall below the ideal relationship posited in the 
above paragraphs. This suggests that, for a majority of words, participants made 
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judgments that would be labeled as “overconfident” by some conventions (e.g., 
Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977).2  
Utilization of Cue 
These analyses provide strong evidence that participants’ recall to JOL calibration 
may be improved if they do make use of the external cue.  This was not possible in the 
control condition, because the cue was not provided.  My theory predicts, however, that 
provision of a cue will only improve the relationship between prediction and performance 
when an affirmation is provided.  However, my theory also predicts that provision of an 
affirmation alone should in no way influence the relationship between confidence and 
recall. 
To test these predictions, I ran a multilevel regression analysis to determine if the 
relationship between confidence for a given word pair and recall for a given word pair 
changed, as a function of experimental condition.  In this analysis, word pairs were 
nested within participants, wherein confidence was regressed on to recall.  The logic to 
this analysis is that stated confidence for a given word pair should predict later recall for 
that same word pair, to the extent that individuals are able to correctly detect which 
words they can predict and which they cannot.  However, if my theory holds, there 
should be a three-way interaction between recall, affirmation, and the provision of 
feedback, such that later recall is more strongly predictive of confidence estimates when 
both an external cue and an affirmation are provided. 
The findings from the multi-level model proposed above are found in Table 4. 
The intercept for this model, 36.51%, represents average word confidence for words that 
                                                 
2
 As in the pilot, JOL over-estimation was greatest in the negative-negative word pairs but this was not a 
focus of the analyses that follow. 
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were not recalled successfully by participants in the control condition. If participants had 
perfect knowledge of word difficulty, their confidence for these words might be expected 
to be 0%. In contrast, an intercept of 36.51 indicates that participants in this experiment 
tended to be overconfident for words that they were not able to successfully recall. 
The effect of recall on confidence was significant, p < 0.001 , and can be 
interpreted as participants tending to be 6.17% more confident for successfully recalled 
words. This means, as expected, that participants were able to adjust their confidence 
inline with word difficulty, even without being presented with a word cue or self-
affirmation manipulation. However, a modest increase of 6.17% confidence for correctly 
recalled words could be argued to represent only limited insight on the part of the 
participant into their ability to successfully memorize a word. 
The effect of the between subjects variables on confidence for unsuccessfully 
recalled words was also examined. None of these predictors were significant in this 
model. This indicates a lack of support for the thesis, as well as a failure to replicate the 
findings in Blanton et al. (2001).  This suggests that participants did not alter their 
confidence due to the presence of an affirmation, that they were not influenced by the 
presence or absence of a veridical cue and they did not overcome resistance to utilizing 
the cue when presented with an affirmation.  Although this indicates a failure to support 
the primary or alternative hypotheses, some nonsignificant trends are suggestive. 
Recall one debiasing effect on confidence would be shown by confident 
participants showing a willingness to use feedback (regardless of whether or not there 
was an affirmatison).  There was a nonsignificant trend (p = .14) for participants to be 
less confident when veridical cues were presented. This effect reduces average 
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confidence by 6.08%; reducing the intecept term to 30.43% for incorrectly recalled 
words. This reduction moves confidence toward the ideal of 0%, and thus improves the 
calibration between recall and confidence. 
In addition, there was a nonsignificant trend for recall and the presence of a 
veridical cue to interact (p = .13). This effect means that average confidence rose by an 
additional 3.06% for correctly recalled words, when the cue was present. This increase in 
confidence for correctly recalled words is smaller than the increase seen when the cue is 
not present, but an increase in confidence is still in the desired direction for increasing 
calibration of confidence and recall.3 
 Other than examining whether the combination of the cue and affirmation 
condition resulted in debiasing, it is also possible to examine whether affirmation 
enhanced the correspondence of cue to confidence. That is, an analysis can investigate 
whether participants were able to take the cue given and use that as an anchor for their 
confidence, and whether affirmation influenced the extent to which this occurred. For this 
analysis, it makes sense to only examine participants who were presented with a cue, as 
only these participants had the opportunity to use the cue. Using a similar model to the 
above multi-level model, confidence was regressed on recall at level one, with the 
percent value of the cue given and affirmation as level two predictors (see Table 5.). 
 The intercept for this model was 26.06% confidence, indicating that participants 
were confident of getting words correct 26.06% of the time on average, controlling for 
the effect of recall, cue and affirmation. Interestingly, in this model the relationship 
between recall and confidence was not significant. However, the main effect of cue was 
                                                 
3
 Removing affirmation from the model , word cue had a significant main effect on confidence, p < .05, and 
word cue significantly interacted with the presence of a word cue, p < .05. 
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significant, and an interaction between cue and recall approached significance. The 
nature of this effect was that participants gave more weight to a cue for words they later 
correctly remembered (B = .11) than for words they later failed to remember (B = .15). 
No other interactions in this model were significant. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Another way to investigate the influence of threat on cue acceptance is to examine 
whether particularly threatening cues were of less use in debiasing overconfidence. One 
way to approach this issue is to use practice trials as a measure for average confidence 
and recall for each participant. These scores of confidence and recall are independent of 
debiasing procedures used during experiment trials. Using practice recall and confidence, 
it is possible to determine the relation of participants’ recall to their confidence. It is then 
possible to investigate how this relationship tended to influence confidence in the 
experiment. If participants tend to predict a better performance than they delivered at 
practice, then they may have more difficulty accepting cues instructing them to lower 
confidence. That is, participants with low practice recall but high practice confidence 
might be assumed to be participants with motivated high confidence. Such participants 
were originally predicted to be the most resistant to cue based debiasing. If cue threat had 
any impact on results, debiasing due to cue would be attenuated to the extent that a 
participant was over confident at practice. 
 Using a between subjects regression approach, aggregate scores for confidence 
and recall were created for each participant for both their practice and experiment trials. 
Average confidence for experiment trials was regressed on experiment trial recall, 
practice confidence, practice recall, and a binary variable for cue condition. If practice 
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overconfidence had a an effect on cue debiasing then a three-way interaction between 
practice recall, practice confidence and cue condition should be significant in this model. 
The three-way interaction between practice recall, practice confidence and cue 
condition interaction was found to be significant, p = 0.02, controlling for the effect of 
experiment recall. The pattern was not as predicted but suggestive of a potentially 
interesting psychological dynamic (see Table 6.).  
The top panel of Figure 3 shows estimated experiment confidence of participants 
with low practice recall (8.53% accuracy). This reveals little more than a main effect of 
confidence, with those higher in confidence being more accurate than those low in 
confidence. In contrast, the bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that among participants with 
high practice recall (48.64%) there was an interaction pattern, such that the cue lowered 
the confidence of those originally high in confidence and raised the confidence of those 
originally low.  This pattern suggests that the feedback was being utilized more among 
those who were originally high in recall in the practice trials. 
Discussion 
The central hypothesis of this study was that self-affirmation would enhance the 
confidence debiasing effect of a veridical cue. However, none of the analyses conducted 
offered support for this hypothesis. A multi-level model was used to investigate the effect 
of self-affirmation together with cue condition on the participant level variables. In this 
model, confidence was regressed on recall, the participant level variable, and also on self-
affirmation and cue condition, which were group level variables. An interaction between 
self-affirmation and cue condition was predicted by the hypothesis that self-affirmation 
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enhanced the effect of cue. However, the predicted interaction between self-affirmation 
and cue condition was not found. 
Part of the logic of this study was that debiasing via self-affirmation alone, as 
postulated in Blanton et al. (2001), should not occur. As a consequence, it was predicted 
that self-affirmation would not have a main effect on confidence. Consistent with this 
prediction, no analyses found evidence for the influence of self-affirmation on debiasing. 
Another hypothesis, based on previous research on feedback and cues, was that 
presentation of veridical cues should have a debiasing effect on confidence, even without 
being combined with self-affirmation. In the multi-level model referred to above, 
evidence for the effect of cue would be shown by a significant interaction of cue 
condition with recall, or a main effect of cue condition. Neither of these effects were 
significant in the multi-level model tested. However, the effect of cue on confidence 
showed some indication of trending toward significance.4 
All analyses of confidence compared to recall showed that calibration of recall to 
confidence was generally poor and biased in the direction of participants giving a greater 
likelihood of recall than their percent likelihood of recall. In contrast, preliminary 
analyses of cue showed that the cues used in the study were highly correlated with actual 
recall, and that cues for a given word tended to be better indicators of recall for that word 
than participants’ own JOLs. Consequently, a participant using cues alone for their JOL 
would likely have achieved better JOL to recall calibration than would be observed 
among participants relying more on naïve confidence estimates. However, participants 
                                                 
4
 As noted in the results, removing affirmation from the multi-level model led cue condition to become a 
significant predictor of confidence for both incorrectly and correctly recalled worlds. This effect was 
clearly fragile, however, and can only be taken as a suggestion that feedback had some influence on 
participant confidence. 
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that were given cues did not solely rely on the cue to guide their confidence: when a cue 
was presented to participants, cue and confidence were not perfectly correlated, and in 
fact, although there was a strong association between cue and confidence, there was 
evidence that cues tended not to be fully accepted by participants. This suggests that cues 
could be used more by participants, but this study did not demonstrate a mechanism that 
allowed that to happen. 
The aim of this study was to demonstrate that self-affirmation could act as buffer 
against threatening information, or the veridical cues, and thus would offer a method by 
which cues could be accepted and used by individuals rather than rejected and ignored. 
Unfortunately, no evidence was found for self-affirmation aiding debiasing in any way. 
Self-affirmation was not a significant predictor in either of two multi-level models 
analyzed, indicating that self-affirmation had no effect on debiasing. In other words, self-
affirmation did not directly influence the relationship between recall and confidence. In 
this respect, the study did not replicate the findings of Blanton et al. (2001). The failure to 
replicate the direct debiasing of self-affirmation does not strengthen the competing 
hypothesis, that self-affirmation interacts with cue presentation, as no evidence was 
found to back either the old or the new hypotheses. 
Reasons for Self-Affirmation Null Findings 
One possible reason that self-affirmation did not have an effect on confidence is 
that the self-affirmation manipulation itself failed, such that participants in the study were 
not sufficiently affirmed by the manipulation used. Unfortunately, due to fears about 
manipulation checks influencing self-affirmation tasks (Steele & Liu, 1983), a 
manipulation check could not be incorporated in the experiment design. As a result, it is 
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not possible to do much more than speculate about whether the self-affirmation task 
worked or not. However, there was initial concern when designing this experiment that 
self-affirmation may “run out” over the course of a very long memory task. In an effort to 
boost affirmation and potentially lengthen its effect, two self-affirmation manipulations 
were used instead of just one. Although this precaution was taken in designing the 
experiment, the self-affirmation may still have weakened over time and not lasted over 
the course of the entire memory task. However, some exploratory analyses not reported 
above argued against this.  Separate regression models were run examining either only 
the first third of words seen by a participant, or the first three words. These analyses also 
failed to reveal an effect of self-affirmation. This suggests that either the self-affirmation 
did not enhance self-regard, or it did it had no influence on confidence debiasing. 
Other exploratory analyses suggested that cues were rejected by participants, but 
not due to threat. Instead, analyses suggested cue debiasing tended to be highest among 
participants with high levels of recall during the practice task, raising the confidence of 
those initially very low and lowering the confidence of those initially high. This finding 
suggests that cues were not rejected by all participants. Unfortunately, the specific pattern 
argued against there being ego threat in the task developed, for which the affirmation 
given might help debias. For instance, it is arguable that highly confident participants 
should be the participants threatened most by cue debiasing, because those participants 
would have to give up their high confidence in order to accept debiasing cues. In fact, 
analyses showed that highly confident participants that were also highly accurate during 
practice trials tended to have little problem accepting cues, but any participant with low 
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practice trial recall, including participants that were particularly overconfident, tended to 
ignore cues, perhaps because they were not engaged in the task.  
Importantly, these analyses showed no indication that cues were threatening to 
participants in the way theorized above. Any suggestion that participants did not find 
cues to be threatening is problematic for the hypotheses of this study because, if cues 
were not threatening to participants then there would be no way for self-affirmation to 
influence debiasing.  
Further Research 
  Future research could attempt to discover whether introducing a stronger self-
affirmation manipulation, or more threatening cues, changes the results of the current 
study. Such changes might determine, for instance, whether self-affirmation can interact 
with cue to enable greater debiasing, or whether the theory put forward by Blanton et al. 
(2001) , whereby debiasing functions as a main effect of self-affirmation, is correct. A 
starting point would be to use a task with greater ego-involvement on the part of 
participants, to ensure that cues are threatening to participants. Using an IQ test as the 
task would ensure that most participants are engaged in performing well on the task, and 
that cues would be particularly threatening. 
 If a debiasing technique can be established using self-affirmation, another 
potential step would be to move toward a practical application. Arguably, debiasing 
confidence for word-pair memorization task has little real-world utility, whereas 
debiasing for some test performances (e.g., IQ tests, or academic standardized test) would 
suggest some practical use for this kind technique. An older study by Fischoff et al. 
(1977) demonstrated that overconfidence when gambling can lead to real monetary 
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losses. That kind of real world impact could also be added to such research methodology 
used in this study. Recalling the example of the overconfident student, who skips 
studying when she really needed to buckle down, perhaps some kind of procedure could 
be developed to examine such decisions to continue or stop learning. Ideally, 
development of a self-affirmation debiasing technique would help to debias 
overconfident students, and that debiased students would then reap the benefits of extra 
study, leading to enhanced learning of important material and better exam performance. 
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Table 1 
Average pilot study recall and JOL for valenced word pairs. 
 Positive Words Neutral Words Negative Words 
Mean Recall  (%) 42.86 28.57 27.47 
SD Recall (%) 8.38 12.32 18.42 
Mean JOL (%) 51.33 44.91 48.91 
SD JOL (%) 7.54 5.39 8.38 
Note. JOL = Judgment of Learning 
 
Table 2 
Pilot study recall and JOL for each word pair. 
Cue Word, Target Word JOL (%) Recall (%) 
ADVICE, STATUE 54.35 19.23 
BANNER, GENDER 47.19 23.08 
CANNON, RAIN 50.66 53.85 
CONTEXT, BASKET 46.53 19.23 
DETAIL, ERRAND 47.74 19.23 
ELEVATOR, HIGHWAY 52.22 57.69 
KETTLE, FABRIC 44.65 23.08 
KEY, WHISTLE 45.83 26.92 
KNOT, PASSAGE 38.78 23.08 
MANNER, SHADOW 36.38 23.08 
SALUTE, CORK 37.78 23.08 
TOOLS, HABIT 42.50 30.77 
TRUNK, SPHERE 41.15 23.08 
VIOLIN, AVENUE 43.02 34.62 
BATH, CHAMPION 40.87 42.31 
BEACH, CIRCUS 55.67 61.54 
CAKE, PRIEST 48.04 38.46 
CROWN, MOVIE 63.37 42.31 
EXERCISE, DIAMOND 46.88 38.46 
GARDEN, TALENT 48.96 42.31 
HUG, TREASURE 59.90 38.46 
JOKE, LEADER 60.56 34.62 
LUST, DIPLOMA 36.60 38.46 
PERFUME, BUNNY 45.38 50 
RADIO, RESCUE 53.30 26.92 
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REUNION, CASH 51.78 50 
TOY, FAME 55.07 46.15 
ZEST, WEDDING 52.31 50 
ABUSE, RABIES 46.11 15.38 
AFRAID, MUTILATE 43.33 15.38 
BEES, BOMB* 57.78 69.23 
BETRAY, TERRIBLE 60.56 30.77 
DEBT, BULLETS* 32.22 23.08 
DISLOYAL, SUFFOCATE 52.22 23.08 
DUMP, CANCER* 47.78 61.54 
HATRED, TORTURE 57.78 23.08 
KNIFE, FEVER* 42.22 30.77 
PRISON, BURN* 59.44 38.46 
SLAUGHTER, TRAGEDY 66.11 15.38 
STAIN, DIVORCE* 52.78 76.92 
TERRORIST, ULCER* 48.33 38.46 
TOBACCO, ASSAULT* 42.78 38.46 
ACCIDENT, SLUM* 49.38 30.77 
CANCER, REJECTED 50.63 30.77 
COFFIN, STRESS* 46.13 38.46 
DROWN, SLAVE* 50.00 38.46 
INFECTION, RAGE 33.63 0 
KILLER, DISASTER* 55.63 23.08 
MOLD, TRAITOR* 37.88 23.08 
MURDERER, DISTRESSED 45.63 15.38 
NIGHTMARE, POLLUTE 38.75 7.69 
POVERTY, SNAKE 38.75 7.69 
RAPE, BANKRUPT 51.88 7.69 
ROBBER, POISON 56.25 23.08 
TERRIFIED, POISON* 57.50 15.38 
VICTIM, THORN 48.13 7.69 
Mean 48.52 31.59 
SD 7.76 16.20 
Note. Word pairs marked * not used after the pilot study 
 
Table 3 
Main study recall, cue and residual for each word pair. 
Cue Word, Target Word Recall (%) Cue (%) Residual 
BEACH, CIRCUS 38.46 70 -31.54 
BETRAY, TERRIBLE 15.38 40 -24.62 
GARDEN, TALENT 28.21 50 -21.79 
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MANNER, SHADOW 10.26 30 -19.74 
TOOLS, HABIT 20.51 40 -19.49 
DISLOYAL, SUFFOCATE 46.15 40 -17.18 
AFRAID, MUTILATE 5.13 20 -14.87 
SLAUGHTER, TRAGEDY 5.13 20 -14.87 
TERRIFIED, POISON 5.13 20 -14.87 
BATH, CHAMPION 35.9 50 -14.1 
HATRED, TORTURE 12.82 30 -12.05 
SALUTE, CORK 20.51 30 -9.49 
HUG, TREASURE 30.77 40 -9.23 
CANNON, RAIN 51.28 60 -8.72 
KETTLE, FABRIC 23.08 30 -6.92 
VIOLIN, AVENUE 33.33 40 -6.67 
PERFUME, BUNNY 43.59 50 -6.41 
ADVICE, STATUE 15.38 20 -4.62 
CONTEXT, BASKET 15.38 20 -4.62 
DETAIL, ERRAND 15.38 20 -4.62 
KNOT, PASSAGE 25.64 30 -4.36 
CAKE, PRIEST 35.9 40 -4.1 
EXERCISE, DIAMOND 38.46 40 -1.54 
CROWN, MOVIE 48.72 50 -1.28 
REUNION, CASH 48.72 50 -1.28 
ELEVATOR, HIGHWAY 58.97 60 -1.03 
ABUSE, RABIES 20.51 20 0.51 
TOY, FAME 51.28 50 1.28 
ZEST, WEDDING 51.28 50 1.28 
MURDERER, DISTRESSED 17.95 30 3.08 
LUST, DIPLOMA 43.59 40 3.59 
CANCER, REJECTED 46.15 40 6.15 
BANNER, GENDER 38.46 30 8.46 
KEY, WHISTLE 38.46 30 8.46 
TRUNK, SPHERE 38.46 30 8.46 
JOKE, LEADER 48.72 40 8.72 
NIGHTMARE, POLLUTE 23.08 20 13.08 
POVERTY, SNAKE 23.08 10 13.08 
RAPE, BANKRUPT 25.64 10 15.64 
VICTIM, THORN 25.64 10 15.64 
INFECTION, RAGE 17.94 0 17.95 
RADIO, RESCUE 48.72 30 18.72 
Average 30.1 33.33 -3.24 
SD 14.71 15.57 12.16 
Note. Word pairs sorted from most negative to most positive residual. Top two word pairs 
removed from analyses due to large residuals. 
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Table 4 
Multi-level model of confidence regressed on recall, at the participant level, and cue 
condition and affirmation between subject variables. 
Predictor Estimate Standard 
Error 
Degrees 
Of Freedom 
t-Value Significance 
Intercept 36.51 2.8 142.75 13.03 < 0.001*** 
Recall (0, 1) 6.17 1.39 124.64 4.45 < 0.001*** 
Cue Condition (0, 1) -6.08 4.05 143.17 -1.5 0.14 
Affirmation Condition (0, 1) 0.70 4.05 143 0.17 0.86 
Recall by Cue 3.06 2.02 125.51 1.51 0.13 
Recall by Affirmation 1.22 1.99 128.68 0.61 0.54 
Affirmation by Cue -0.88 5.8 143.2 -0.15 0.88 
Recall by Affirmation by Cue -0.28 2.85 127.23 -0.1 0.92 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Table 5. 
Multi-level model of confidence regressed on recall, at the participant level, and cue 
value and affirmation between subject variables. 
Predictor Estimate Standard 
Error 
Degrees 
Of Freedom 
t-Value Significance 
Intercept 26.06 2.73 96.72 9.54 < 0.001*** 
Recall (0, 1) 3.76 2.56 422.42 1.47 0.14 
Cue Value 0.15 0.04 271.8 4.16 < 0.001*** 
Affirmation Condition (0, 1) 0.88 3.89 96.02 0.28 0.82 
Recall by Cue Value 0.11 0.06 274.5 1.88 0.06 
Recall by Affirmation 4.13 3.66 461.53 1.13 0.26 
Affirmation by Cue Value -0.04 0.05 271.5 -0.73 0.47 
Recall by Affirmation by Cue Value -0.76 0.09 274.4 -0.9 0.37 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 6. 
Multiple regression aggregate between subject values of experiment confidence on 
experiment recall, practice confidence, practice recall and cue condition. 
Predictor B Standard 
Error 
Beta t-Value Significance 
Intercept -0.01 0.06   -0.23 0.82 
Experiment Recall 0.23 0.06 0.27 3.96 < 0.001*** 
Practice Confidence 0.67 0.15 0.66 4.58 < 0.001*** 
Practice Recall -0.16 0.23 -0.17 -0.70 0.48 
Cue Condition (0, 1) 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.99 
Practice Confidence by Practice Recall 0.57 0.43 0.40 1.33 0.18 
Practice Confidence by Cue Condition 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.12 0.90 
Practice Recall by Cue Condition 0.43 0.27 0.49 1.60 0.11 
Practice Confidence by  
Practice Recall by Cue Condition -1.30 0.53 -0.82 -2.45 0.02* 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Average word recall regressed on word cue value for control participants. 
Figure 2. Average word recall regressed on word Judgment of Learning confidence for 
control participants. 
Figure 3. Effect of the three-way interaction of cue condition, average practice task 
confidence, and average practice task recall on average experiment task confidence, 
controlling for average experiment task accuracy. 
